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Abstract. Existing techniques for IP address autoconfiguration in mo-
bile ad hoc networks (MANETs) do not address security issues. In this
paper, we first describe some of the existing IP address autoconfigura-
tion schemes, and discuss their security shortcomings. We then provide
solutions to these security issues based on the use of trust models. A
specific trust model is also proposed for use in improving the security of
existing IP address autoconfiguration schemes.
1 Introduction
IP address autoconfiguration is an important task for zero configuration in ad
hoc networks, and many schemes have been proposed [5, 6, 11]. However, per-
forming IP address autoconfiguration in ad hoc networks securely remains a
problem. Most existing schemes are based on the assumption that the ad hoc
network nodes will not behave maliciously. However, this is not always a realistic
assumption, since not only may some malicious nodes be present, but ad hoc
network nodes are often easily compromised.
Of the existing IP address autoconfiguration schemes, we focus here on
requester-initiator schemes. In such a scheme, a node entering the network (the
requester) will not obtain an IP address solely by itself. Instead, it chooses an
existing network node as the initiator, which performs address allocation for it.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review existing
requester-initiator schemes, and analyse their security properties. In Section 3,
we describe how to improve the security of these schemes using trust models.
In Section 4, a new trust model is proposed which can be used to secure the
operation of requester-initiator schemes, and an analysis of this trust model is
given. Finally, a brief conclusion is provided in section 5.
2 Requester-initiator Address Allocation Schemes
We first briefly review two existing requester-initiator schemes. We then use
them to illustrate a variety of security issues that can arise in such schemes.
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Nesargi and Prakash proposed the MANETconf scheme [5], a distributed
dynamic host configuration protocol for MANETs. In this scheme, when a new
node (the requester) joins an ad hoc network, it broadcasts a request message
to its neighbour nodes. If the requester is the only node in the network, then
it becomes an initiator; otherwise, it will receive a reply message from one or
more of its neighbour nodes. It then selects one of its reachable neighbour nodes
as an initiator. Each node in the network stores the set of addresses currently
being used, as well as those that can be assigned to a new node. The initiator
selects an IP address from the available addresses and checks the uniqueness of
the address by broadcasting a message to all network nodes. If the IP address
is already being used, then the initiator selects another IP address and repeats
the process until it finds a unique IP address which it allocates to the requester.
Fazio, Villri and Puliafito [2] proposed another requester-initiator scheme for
IP address autoconfiguration based on MANETconf [5] and the Perkins-Royer-
Das [6] scheme. In this protocol, a NetID is associated with each ad hoc network,
and each node is therefore identified by a (NetID, HostID) pair. When a new
node (a requester) joins an ad hoc network, it randomly selects a 4-byte HostID
and requests the initiator to allocate it a unique address. The initiator randomly
chooses a candidate IP address and broadcasts it to all other nodes to check for
uniqueness. When the initiator finds a unique address, it sends the requester this
address and the NetID of the network. The NetID is used to detect merging of
networks. When partitioning happens, the NetID of each part will be changed.
In all requester-initiator schemes, including those briefly described above,
IP address allocation for new nodes depends on the correct behaviour of the
initiator and other existing nodes. However, in reality, malicious nodes may be
present in an ad hoc network, potentially causing a variety of possible problems.
We now note a number of potential security problems.
Firstly, if a malicious node acts as an initiator, it can deliberately assign a
duplicate address to a requester, causing IP address collisions. In schemes where
a node stores the set of addresses currently being used, it can also trigger IP
address allocations for nodes that do not exist, thereby making IP addresses
unavailable for other nodes that may wish to join the MANET. This gives rise
to a serious denial-of-service attack.
Secondly, a malicious node can act as a requester and send address request
messages to many initiators simultaneously, who will communicate with all other
nodes in order to find a unique address. This will potentially use a lot of the
available bandwidth, again causing a denial-of-service attack.
Thirdly, a malicious node in the network could claim that the candidate IP
address is already in use whenever it receives a message from an initiator to
check for duplication. As a result no new nodes will be able to get an IP address
and join the network. It can also change its IP address to deliberately cause an
IP address collision, forcing another node to choose a new IP address. This could
lead to the interruption of that node’s TCP sessions.
The main purpose of this paper is to consider means to address these threats.
We start by showing how a trust model satisfying certain simple properties can
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be used to reduce these threats. Note that all three threats identified above
result in denial-of-service attacks — this provides us with an implicit definition
of what we mean by a malicious node, i.e. a node seeking to deny service to other
network nodes; the nature of a malicious node is discussed further below.
3 Solutions Based on Trust Models
According to clause 3.3.54 of ITU-T X.509 [9], trust is defined as follows: “Gen-
erally an entity can be said to ‘trust’ a second entity when the first entity makes
the assumption that the second entity will behave exactly as the first entity ex-
pects”. In this paper, trust (in the form of a trust value) reflects the degree of
belief that one entity has in the correctness of the behaviour of another entity.
It is dynamic, and reduces if an entity misbehaves, and vice versa.
For the moment we do not assume any particular method of computing trust
values; we simply suppose that such a method has been selected. We use the
following terminology. For any nodes A and B in an ad hoc network, the trust
value held by A for B, i.e. the level of trust A has in B, is a rational (floating
point) value denoted by TA(B). Every node A has a threshold trust value, denoted
by T ∗A. That is, A deems B as trustable if and only if the trust value that A
currently assigns to B is at least its threshold trust value, i.e. TA(B) ≥ T ∗A;
otherwise node A will regard node B as a potentially malicious node.
Each node maintains its own threshold value T ∗A, i.e. different nodes may
choose different trust thresholds. Hence the definition of malicious node may
vary from node to node, depending on local policy. Every node also keeps a
blacklist. Whenever it finds another node for which its trust value is lower than
its threshold trust value, it deems this node a malicious node and adds this node
to its blacklist. It will regularly calculate its trust values for the nodes in its
blacklist and update its blacklist based on these new trust values. Except for the
messages used for calculating trust values, it will ignore all other messages from
nodes in its blacklist and will not route any other messages to these nodes.
One underlying assumption in this paper is that the number of malicious
nodes in an ad hoc network is small. We also assume there is a trust model
available with the following two properties, where the neighbour nodes of a node
are those nodes that are within direct transmission range. (1) Any node can
make a direct trust judgement on its neighbour nodes based on the information
it gathers in a passive mode. If one of its neighbour nodes is malicious, it can
detect the misbehaviour of this malicious node. It maintains trust values for
all its neighbour nodes and regularly updates them. (2) Any node is able to
calculate the trust values of non-neighbour nodes based on the trust values kept
by itself and/or other nodes. We now show how such a trust model can be used
to improve the security of any requester-initiator scheme.
3.1 Choosing a Trustable Node as the Initiator
When a nodeN joins a network, it broadcasts a request messageNeighbour Query
containing T ∗N to its neighbour nodes. If the requester is the only node in the
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network, then it becomes an initiator; otherwise, each of the other nodes re-
ceiving a Neighbour Query message will check the trust values it hold for its
neighbour nodes, and send N a reply message InitREP, containing identifiers of
the nodes for which the trust values it holds are greater than or equal to T ∗N .
Once N has received InitREP messages from its neighbour nodes, it combines
these messages and chooses as its initiator the responding neighbour node which
appears in the most received InitREP messages. A malicious node is unlikely to
appear in InitREP messages generated by honest neighbour nodes. Hence, given
our assumption that a majority of the nodes in the network are honest nodes,
the probability that a malicious node will be chosen as an initiator is low.
3.2 Checking for Duplication of the Candidate Address
When an initiator A chooses a candidate IP address for a new node, it broad-
casts an Initiator Request message to check for duplication. In order to protect
a requester-initiator scheme against a DoS attack caused by malicious nodes
claiming the possession of arbitrary candidate IP addresses chosen by initiators,
the trust model can be used to discover possible malicious nodes. If initiator
A receives a reply message Add Collision from an existing node (node B, say)
indicating that B is already using the candidate IP address and B is not in A’s
blacklist, then A will react to this reply as follows.
A either maintains a trust value for B or can calculate one (if B is not a
neighbour node). If A’s trust value for B is greater than or equal to T ∗A, then
A believes that the candidate IP address is already being used. Node A will
then choose another candidate IP address and repeat the procedure to check
for duplication. Otherwise, A deems B a malicious node. In this case, A adds
B to its blacklist and ignores this Add Collision message. A also broadcasts a
Malicious Suspect message about B to all other nodes. When it receives A’s
message, each node uses its trust value for node A (if necessary calculating it)
to decide if it should ignore A’s message. If A is deemed trustworthy, then it will
calculate its trust value for B. If its newly calculated trust value for B is lower
than its threshold acceptable trust value, then it adds B to its blacklist. As a
result, misbehaving nodes will be permanently excluded from the network.
3.3 Dealing with Possible Address Collisions
Suppose node E detects a collision of IP addresses between two existing nodes. It
will then send a message about the collision to both of them. Any node (node F ,
say) receiving such a message considers its trust value for node E (calculated if
necessary). If TF (E) ≥ T ∗F , then F will assign itself a new IP address. Otherwise,
F will keep its current IP address and add E to its blacklist.
3.4 Brief Analysis
The above protocol enhancements significantly improve the security of requester-
initiator schemes. Only trusted nodes will be chosen as initiators for address
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allocation. Malicious nodes will be detected and isolated with the cooperation of
other network nodes. The DoS attack caused by a malicious node claiming the
possession of candidate IP addresses is prevented. Only minor computational
costs will be incurred if the number of malicious nodes is small.
However, when a malicious node acts as a requester and simultaneously asks
many initiators for IP address allocation, each initiator will treat this malicious
node as a new node and will not be able to calculate a trust value for it (since
there will no history of past behaviour on which to base the calculations). This
kind of attack cannot be prevented by using the trust model approach described
in this paper. Some other method outside the scope of trust modelling is required.
4 A Novel Trust Model
In the solutions described in section 3, we assume that there is a trust model by
which the trust values between any two nodes can be calculated. Many methods
have been proposed for trust modelling and management, see, for example [3, 10].
Unfortunately, none of them has all the properties discussed in Section 3. Thus,
they cannot be straightforwardly adopted for use in our scheme. In this section
we propose a trust model specifically designed to be used in this environment.
In our trust model, each trust value is in the range 0 to +1, signifying a
continuous range from complete distrust to complete trust, i.e. TA(B) ∈ [0,+1].
Each node maintains a trust table in which it stores the current trust value of all
its neighbour nodes. When a new node joins a network, it sets the trust values
for its neighbour nodes in its trust table to an initial value Tinit, and dynamically
updates these values using information gathered. A node computes its trust value
for another node using one of the following two methods, depending on whether
or not the other node is a neighbour node.
4.1 Calculating Trust Values Between Neighbour Nodes
If B is a neighbour node of A, then A calculates TA(B) based on the information
A has gathered about B in previous transactions, using so-called passive mode,
i.e. without requiring any special interrogation packets. Here we adopt the ap-
proach of Pirzada and McDonald [10] to gather information about neighbour
nodes and to quantify trust. Potential problems could arise when using passive
observation within a wireless ad hoc environment [8, 12]. The severity of these
problems depends on the density of the network and the type of Medium Access
Control protocol being used. This is an open issue which needs further research.
In our paper, we assume that these problems will not occur.
Information about the behaviour of other nodes can be gathered by analysing
received, forwarded and overheard packets monitored at the various protocol
layers. Possible events that can be recorded in passive mode are the number
and accuracy of: 1) Frames received, 2) Streams established, 3) Control packets
forwarded, 4) Control packets received, 5) Routing packets received, 6) Routing
packets forwarded, 7) Data forwarded, 8) Data received. We also use the following
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events: 9) The length of time that B has used its current IP address in the
network compared with the total length of time that B has been part of the
network, and 10) How often a collision of B’s IP address has been detected.
The information obtained by monitoring all these types of event is classified
into n (n ≥ 1) trust categories. Trust categories signify the specific aspect of
trust that is relevant to a particular relationship and is used to compute trust
for other nodes in specific situations. A uses the following equation, as proposed
in [10], to calculate its trust for B:
TA(B) =
n∑
i=1
WA(i)TA,i(B)
where WA(i) is the weight of the ith trust category to A and
∑n
i=1WA(i) = 1;
TA,i(B) is the situational trust of A for B in the ith trust category and is in the
range [0,+1] for every trust category. More details can be found in [10].
Each node maintains trust values for its neighbour nodes in a trust value
table, and regularly updates the table using information gathered. If a neighbour
node moves out of radio range, the node entry in the trust table is kept for a
certain period of time, since MANETs are highly dynamic and the neighbour
node may soon be back in the range. However, if the neighbour node remains
unreachable, then the entry is deleted from the trust table.
4.2 Calculating trust values for other nodes
If B is not A’s neighbour node (as may be the case in multi-hop wireless ad hoc
networks), A needs to send a “Trust Calculation Request” to B, and B returns
to A a “Trust Calculation Reply”, which contains trust values for all nodes in
the route along which it is sent back to A, as follows.
We adopt the Route Discovery method proposed in the Dynamic Source
Routing Protocol (DSR) [7] to send A’s Trust Calculation Request (TCReq)
message to B. Node A transmits a TCReq as a single local broadcast packet,
received by all nodes currently within wireless transmission range of A. The
TCReq identifies the initiator (A) and target (B), and also contains a unique
request identifier, determined by A. Each TCReq also contains a route record of
the address of each intermediate node through which this particular copy of the
TCReq has been forwarded. When a node receives this TCReq, if it is not the
target of the TCReq and has recently seen another TCReq from A bearing the
same request identification and target address, or if this node’s own address is
already listed in the route record, it is discarded. Otherwise, it appends its own
address to the route record in the TCReq and propagates it by transmitting it
as a local broadcast packet. The process continues until the TCReq reaches B.
When B receives the TCReq message, a route from A to B has been found.
Node B now returns a Trust Calculation Reply (TCReply) to node A along the
reverse sequence of nodes listed in the route record, together with a copy of the
accumulated route record from the TCReq. In our trust model, the TCReply also
contains a trust value list of the trust value for each node in the route record,
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as calculated by its predecessor in the route. That is, whenever a node in this
route receives a TCReply, it forwards the message to the preceding node on the
route and appends to the trust value list its trust value for the succeeding node
on the route, i.e. the node which forwarded the TCReply to it.
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Fig. 1. A route from A to B
For example, as shown in Figure 1, when a TCReq is sent along the route
A→ C → D → E → B and arrives at B, a route is found, and the route record
is ACDEB. B will send a TCReply back to A along the route B → E → D →
C → A. The immediate nodes E, D, and C append TE(B), TD(E), TC(D) to the
trust value list respectively when they send back the TCReply. Therefore, when
node A receives the TCReply, it will obtain a trust value list (TE(B), TD(E),
TC(D)); it will also have TA(C) from its own trust value table. Thus, A finds a
route to B and also trust values for all the nodes in this route.
Following the above procedure, A may find one or more routes to B. Since
there might be malicious nodes present, A will check if each route is a valid
route, i.e., if all the trust values in the TCReply message are above A’s thresh-
old acceptable trust value T ∗A. Observe that when a malicious node receives a
TCReply, it can change any of the trust values in the trust value list it receives,
which only contains trust values for succeeding nodes on the route. However, it
cannot change the trust value of any other node for itself. Suppose the route
received by A consists of nodes A = N0, N1, . . . , Ni = B. If a certain trust value
TNm(Nm+1) on this route is below T
∗
A, then either node Nm+1 is a malicious
node or another node Nk(k ≤ m) is a malicious node and has intentionally
changed the trust value list when it received the TCReply. Therefore, when A
obtains the trust list, it will learn that there is at least one malicious node in
the route, and this route is therefore regarded as an invalid route.
If there is no valid route from A to B, A cannot calculate its trust value for
B. In order to prevent certain attacks (see below), A is obliged to regard B as
a potentially malicious node. Given that malicious nodes are rare, this situation
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is unlikely to occur frequently. If there does exist at least one valid route from A
to B, then we can calculate the trust value of node A for node B based on the
weighted average of the trust values of the nodes preceding node B on all valid
routes for node B, and the weight of each route is based on the trust rating of
all the intermediate nodes on each valid route. Suppose the route R is a valid
route from A to B, denoted by:
N0,R → N1,R → N2,R → ...→ Ni−2,R → Ni−1,R → Ni,R
where N0,R = A and Ni,R = B. A can then calculate the trust weight for route
R by computing the geometric average of the trust values listed in the TCReply
in route R (all these trust values are above T ∗A given that R is a valid route):
WA,B(R) =
i−2∏
j=0
TNj,R(Nj+1,R)
1
i−1
A’s trust value for node B is computed as the weighted arithmetic average
of the trust values of A for B on all valid routes, R1, R2, . . . , Rg, say.
TA(B) =
1∑g
h=1WA,B(Rh)
g∑
h=1
(WA,B(Rh)TNi−1,Rh (B))
Node A only calculates its trust value for B when needed, and A will not
store this trust value in its trust table. This is particularly appropriate for highly
dynamic ad hoc networks.
4.3 Analysis
An underlying assumption for the scheme described above is that a node is con-
sidered malicious if it does not adhere to the protocols used in the network.
Under this definition, two types of malicious node can be identified. Firstly, a
node may be malicious all the time, i.e. it will behave maliciously when interact-
ing with other nodes for all types of network traffic; it may also be malicious in
its behaviour with respect to the trust model by sending incorrect trust values
to requesting nodes. This type of malicious node behaviour can be detected by
its neighbours, and thus we can expect that an honest neighbour will maintain
a low trust value for such a node.
Alternatively, a node can behave honestly for all network interactions, and
only behave maliciously with respect to trust model functionality. In our scheme,
malicious nodes of this type will not be detected by other nodes, and the calcu-
lation of trust values will potentially be affected by these nodes. This is therefore
an example of a vulnerability in our trust model approach. Hence, in the anal-
ysis below, we assume that all malicious nodes are of the first type, and we can
assume that a misbehaving node will be detected by its neighbour nodes.
The trust value of any node A for any other node B in the network can be
calculated. We claim that the existence of a small number of malicious nodes will
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not affect the calculation of the trust values. First note that, if B is A’s neighbour
node, A calculates its trust value based on information it gathers itself, which
will not be affected by the existence of malicious nodes. Otherwise, A calculates
its trust value for B based on the trust values listed in the TCReply in one or
more routes from A to B.
If there are malicious nodes in a route R from A to B, then there will be a
unique malicious node Nk,R ‘closest’ to A on this route − all nodes on this route
that are closer to A can therefore be trusted not to modify the trust value list.
Consider the route R:
A = N1,R → · · · → Nk−1,R → Nk,R → Nk+1,R → · · · → Ni,R = B
where Nk,R is malicious and Nk−1,R is honest. When the TCReply message
from B to A is forwarded to node Nk,R by node Nk+1,R, node Nk,R appends
TNk,R(Nk+1,R) to the trust value list and send this TCReply message to node
Nk−1,R. Since node Nk,R is a malicious node, it may deliberately modify (lower
or raise) some of the trust values in the trust value list, i.e. any of (Tk,R(Nk+1,R),
TNk+1,R(Nk+2,R), · · ·, TNi−1,R(Ni,R)). Moreover, other malicious nodes on this
route may collude and raise each other’s trust values. However, TNk−1,R(Nk,R)
should be very low, since the maliciousness of Nk,R will be detected by its honest
neighbour node Nk−1,R. When A receives the TCReply message, A will regard
this route as invalid, and will not use this route to calculate its trust value for
B. Hence all intermediate nodes in a valid route must be honest.
The number of malicious nodes that our trust model can tolerate varies
depending on the network topology. Our scheme requires at least one valid route
from A to B in order to calculate the trust value of A for B. If at any time,
no valid route from A to B is found, A cannot calculate a trust value for B. In
this case, if A regards B as an honest node, a malicious node B can attack our
trust model by modifying the route record when B receives a request message,
or by just ignoring this request message to prevent A from finding a valid route
to B. Thus, as mentioned in Section 4.2, if A cannot calculate a trust value for
B, then A must treat B as as a potentially malicious node. If this trust model
is used in the scheme described in Section 3, A adds B to its blacklist. However,
a MANET is highly dynamic. A can calculate its trust value for B and update
its blacklist frequently as long as a new valid route from A to B can be found
when the topology of the network changes. All honest nodes will adhere to our
trust model and make sure that the TCReply messages are sent back correctly.
The model suffers from Sybil attacks, where a node fraudulently uses multi-
ple identities. We can use other methods to prevent Sybil attacks; for example,
it may be possible to use trusted functionality in a node to provide a unique
node identity. A detailed discussion of such techniques is outside the scope of
this paper. We also ignored the problem posed by malicious nodes impersonating
honest nodes. This problem cannot be completely overcome without using origin
authentication mechanisms. We assume that, in environments where imperson-
ation is likely to be a problem, an authentication mechanism is in place, i.e. fake
TCReply messages sent by a malicious node will be detected. Many protocols
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and mechanisms for authentication and key management are available [1]. How-
ever, providing the necessary key management to support a secure mechanism of
this type is likely to be difficult in an ad hoc environment. As mentioned above,
trusted functionality, if present in a device, may help with this problem. Possible
solutions to these issues will be considered in future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on IP address autoconfiguration in adversarial circumstances.
The main contribution of this paper is to use a trust model to provide a number
of enhancements to improve the security of requester-initiator schemes for IP
address autoconfiguration in an MANET. It also gives a new trust model which
can be used in these enhancements. Nevertheless other possible trust models
with different trust quantification methods can also be applied in our solutions,
as long as they satisfy the properties described in Section 3.
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